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E x e c u t i v e
S u m m a r y
1
BY end-2003, poliomyelitis had beeneliminated from all but 6 countries1 in the
world as a result of the Global Polio Eradication
Initiative, the largest international public health
effort to date. Nearly 5 million children are
walking who would otherwise have been
paralyzed by polio and 1.25 million childhood
deaths have been averted by distributing Vitamin
A during the polio immunization campaigns. 
Once polio has been eradicated, the world 
will reap substantial financial, as well as
humanitarian, dividends due to foregone polio
treatment and rehabilitation costs. Depending on
national decisions on the future use of polio
vaccines, these savings could exceed US$ 1 billion
per year. 
The Global Polio Eradication Initiative
Strategic Plan 2004-20082 outlines activities
required to interrupt poliovirus transmission
(2004-2005), achieve global certification and
mainstream the Global Polio Eradication Initiative
(2006-2008), and prepares for the Global OPV
Cessation Phase (2009 & beyond). This Plan reflects
the major tactical revisions that were introduced in
2003 to interrupt the final chains of polio
transmission, the revised timeframe for certification
of eradication, and the decision to stop
immunization with oral polio vaccine (OPV)
globally as soon as possible after global certification.
Of the 4 objectives outlined in the Plan, the
over-riding objective is the rapid interruption of
polio transmission in the 6 remaining endemic
countries. Eliminating these reservoirs during
2004-2005 is now an urgent international public
health issue because the cessation of mass
immunization campaigns in most polio-free
countries has left the world increasingly vulnerable
to importations of this disease. Objective 1 of the
Plan details the supplementary immunization,
routine immunization, and surveillance activities
needed to finish the job of eradication and protect
the investment made in polio-free areas. Particular
attention is given to ‘intensifying’ supplementary
immunization activities to improve quality and
reach every child. The Plan highlights the 3
countries linked to over 95% of cases in 2003:
Nigeria, India and Pakistan. It recognizes, however,
that with the reduction in polio transmission in
India and Pakistan in late 2003, the risks to global
eradication are increasingly concentrated in
Nigeria. The postponement of eradication activities
in key areas of that country in 2003 led to a marked
increase in the number of polio-paralyzed Nigerian
children and the re-infection of at least 5
neighbouring countries. The narrow window of
opportunity that now exists to eradicate polio can
only be exploited if the leaders of the endemic areas
ensure that every child is immunized during
intensified supplementary immunization activities
in 2004 (SIAs).
Objectives 2 and 3 of the Plan outline activities
for certifying the world polio-free and preparing for
the Global OPV Cessation Phase that will follow.
With the certification process and criteria having
been validated in three WHO regions, Objective 2
focuses on improving surveillance quality
(especially in the 19 countries yet to achieve
certification-standard), reversing declines in
surveillance sensitivity in the regions that have been
certified, and completing Phase II of the Global
Action Plan for the Laboratory Containment of Wild
Polioviruses. Objective 3 outlines the implications of
the 2003 decision to stop OPV after global
certification. Although trivalent OPV will continue
to be the vaccine of choice for routine
immunization through 2008, the plan outlines the
work required to develop the specific products
needed to facilitate the safe cessation of OPV. These
products include: a 3rd edition of the Global Action
Plan for the Laboratory Containment of Wild
Polioviruses (specifying the longterm requirements
for wild poliovirus, vaccine-derived polioviruses
and Sabin-strains), monovalent OPV (mOPV)
stockpiles, IPV produced from Sabin strains 
(S-IPV), and appropriate IPV-containing
combination vaccines. The plan also discusses the
1 Countries with ongoing indigenous wild polioviruses in 2003, in order of intensity of transmission, were: Nigeria, India, Pakistan, Niger,
Afghanistan and Egypt.

















































development of mechanisms to ensure that
countries which desire or need these products
have access to them by 2008.
The fourth and final objective of the plan
addresses the work required to integrate and/or
transition the substantial human resources,
physical infrastructure and institutional
arrangements that were established for polio
eradication into other disease control, surveillance
and response programmes. This objective also
details the programme of work to ‘mainstream’
those polio eradication activities that must be
continued indefinitely (i.e. surveillance,
stockpiles, containment) into existing national,
WHO and UNICEF structures and mechanisms
for managing other serious pathogens which are
subject to high biosafety levels.
The greatest risks to achieving the annual
milestones of this plan are ongoing wild
poliovirus transmission in any of the 6 remaining
endemic countries and an increased frequency of
polio outbreaks due to circulating vaccine-
derived polioviruses (cVDPVs). Implementing
the full activities outlined in the Plan requires
continued technical support from a strong 
polio eradication partnership, financing for the
shortfall of US$ 150 million to interrupt
poliovirus transmission, and identification of
funding for the US$ 380 million budget to
achieve global certification and mainstream the
Global Polio Eradication Initiative. 
The Global Polio Eradication Initiative
Estimated External Financial Resource
Requirements 2004–2008 outlines the resources
required to implement the Global Polio
Eradication Initiative Strategic Plan 2004–20083
and the financial implications of the major risks
to the annual milestones of the Plan. ❐
3 WHO/UNICEF Global Polio Eradication Initiative Estimated External Financial Resource Requirements 2004-2008.
In 1988 the World Health Assembly (WHA),the annual meeting of the ministers of health of
all Member States of the World Health
Organization, voted to launch a global initiative
to eradicate polio. As a result of the Global Polio
Eradication Initiative, the largest international
public health effort to date, by late-2003 polio had
been eliminated from all but 6 countries and fewer
than 1000 children had been paralysed by the
disease that year. More notably, nearly five million
children were walking who would otherwise have
been paralysed by polio and 1.25 million
childhood deaths had been averted by distributing
vitamin A during the polio immunization
campaigns.
The international decision to pursue
eradication of this devastating disease was based
on sound evidence from the WHO Region of the
Americas (AMR) as to the technical feasibility of
such a goal, and on the political and societal
support best exemplified by the commitment of
the service organization Rotary International to
raise financial resources and advocate for polio
eradication. In the 15 years since the decision to
eradicate polio, an extensive network of national
governments, international agencies, private
corporations, foundations, bilateral donors,
humanitarian organizations, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) and development banks
have formed a “global polio partnership”,
spearheaded by the World Health Organization
(WHO), Rotary International, the US Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).
Between 1988 and the mid-1990s, there was a
limited reduction in the number of endemic
countries as the partnership was developed,
broader political commitment secured and further
evidence of the operational feasibility of the AMR
strategies established, particularly in the Western
Pacific Region (WPR). From the mid-1990s, it

















































B a c k g r o u n d2
GLOBAL OPV
CESSATION PHASE
Figure 1: Key targets to interrupt poliovirus transmission (2004-2005), achieve global 
certification and mainstream the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (2006-2008), and during the
Global OPV Cessation Phase (2009 & beyond)
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activities so that by the end of the decade over 
575 million children were regularly being reached
with oral polio vaccine (OPV) through the efforts
of an estimated 20 million volunteers in every low-
and middle- income country in the world. Today,
the technical feasibility of polio eradication has
been demonstrated through the elimination of the
disease from 210 countries, territories, areas, and
large geographic areas of the six remaining
endemic countries. By late 2003, the remaining
chains of wild poliovirus transmission,
concentrated primarily in just five states 
or provinces of Nigeria (1), India (2) and 
Pakistan (2), were the result of missing substantial 
numbers of children during both routine and
supplementary polio immunization activities
during the preceeding years.
Since the Global Polio Eradication Initiative
was launched, the work of the global polio
partnership, including national governments, has
been guided by a series of multi-year strategic
plans, the last of which was published in 20004.
The Global Polio Eradication Initiative Strategic
Plan 2004–2008 replaces and updates the 2000
Plan. This Plan outlines the key activities required
to interrupt poliovirus transmission (2004–2005),
achieve global certification and mainstream the
Global Polio Eradication Initiative (2006–2008)
and prepares for the subsequent Global OPV
Cessation Phase (2009 & beyond) (Figure 1). The
plan reflects the major tactical revisions of strategy
which were introduced in 2003 to interrupt wild
poliovirus transmission worldwide, the revised
timeframe for the certification of polio eradication
globally, and the substantial increase in the
knowledge base for development of policies for the
period after global certification of polio
eradication. This Strategic Plan serves as the basis
for the annual work planning of individual partner


































































































T HE goal of the Global Polio EradicationInitiative is to ensure that poliovirus
transmission is interrupted globally through
coordinated national and international action, 
that the full humanitarian and economic benefits
of eradication are realized, and that the lessons and
infrastructure from its implementation are
utilized in the strengthening of health systems
and control of other important diseases. ❐

















































S t r a t e g i c  A p p r o a c h :
Interruption of wild poliovirus transmission has
been pursued using a combination of routine and
supplementary immunization activities (SIAs),
guided by high quality surveillance (see also 
section 4.2). 
High routine coverage with at least three
doses of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV3) has been
the foundation of the Global Polio Eradication
Initiative. However, global OPV3 coverage was
only 67% in 1988 and never reaching more than
80% in subsequent years. More importantly, even
with good OPV3 coverage polio has persisted in
many developing countries due to a combination
of factors. For example, the level of seroconversion
to OPV3 is often substantially lower in
developing, tropical climates compared with
temperate climates due to host (e.g. concomitant
infections, malnutrition), programmatic (e.g. cold
chain failures) and environmental factors,
requiring substantially more doses to seroconvert
an individual. Furthermore, sub-optimal
sanitation, high population density and tropical
climates combine to facilitate the transmission of
any enterovirus in these areas, including
polioviruses. In such settings, wild poliovirus can
continue to circulate even in highly immunized
populations, requiring synchronized campaigns
with OPV to interrupt transmission.
Consequently, in endemic countries national
immunization days (NIDs) during the low
transmission season for polioviruses have been
conducted to interrupt the major chains of
transmission by rapidly increasing systemic and
intestinal immunity among all children aged less
than five years. All endemic countries had
introduced NIDs by the end of 1999. Where
epidemiologically appropriate, NIDs have been
coordinated across national borders.5 House-to-
house mop-up campaigns, targeting at least one
million children, were added to NIDs to interrupt
the final chains of transmission. In 1999 the
WHA called for the acceleration of activities,
urging endemic countries to increase the number
of NID rounds conducted each year, to add
subnational immunization days (SNIDs) in
particularly high-risk areas, and to introduce a
house-to-house vaccine delivery strategy for NIDs
and SNIDs.6 In April 2003, as a result of an
increasing geographic restriction of poliovirus
transmission and increasingly limited resources,
4 . 1 O b j e c t i v e  1 :
I n t e r r u p t P o l i o v i r u s T r a n s m i s s i o n
O b j e c t i v e s  a n d
M i l e s t o n e s
4
By late 2003, wild poliovirus was endemic in only six countries. Of the three countries which accounted for 95% ofcases globally, two (India and Pakistan) were at the lowest levels of wild poliovirus transmission ever, again
reaffirming the biologic and technical feasibility of polio eradication. With the reduction of cases in these countries and
improvement of quality of activities, the risks to global eradication are increasingly concentrated in Nigeria, where cases
increased markedly in 2003, with subsequent re-infection of a number of neighbouring countries. Consequently, in 2003
the number of countries suffering polio cases due to importations was the highest ever recorded. In 2003 alone, responding
to importations cost over US$ 20 million in emergency mop-up activities. Rapidly eradicating the final polio reservoirs
in 2004 has now become an urgent international public health issue. With the cessation of mass campaigns in most polio-
free countries, the world is increasingly vulnerable to polio and the consequences of importations are increasingly grave.
The narrow window of opportunity which now exists to eradicate polio can only be exploited if the leaders of endemic
areas, particularly in five key states/provinces worldwide, ensure that every child is immunized during intensified mass
immunization activities in 2004.
5 Examples are: Operation MECACAR, west and central Africa synchronized NID operations and synchronization of activities between China and
the SAARC countries.
6 Fifty-second World Health Assembly. Poliomyelitis eradication. World Health Organization, Geneva, 1999 (resolution WHA52.22).
the global Technical Consultative Group for
Poliomyelitis Eradication (TCG) advised
concentrating advocacy, financing and human
resources on the remaining endemic areas to
increase both the number and quality of SIAs. To
rapidly stop the final chains of transmission in
reservoir areas, from 2004 a series of intensified
mass immunization campaigns, overseen by the
highest levels of government, will target the very
limited number of states or provinces which now
threaten the global eradication goal.
S i t u a t i o n  A n a l y s i s :
By late 2003, wild poliovirus transmission had
been interrupted in all but six countries in the
world. Three of these countries, Nigeria, India and
Pakistan, accounted for 95% of cases. Within
these countries, however, endemic transmission
was highly restricted geographically. Of the
remaining geographic areas with ongoing
transmission of indigenous wild polioviruses,7 the
five states/provinces to which 75% of global cases
could be linked are of particular concern: Kano in
Nigeria, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar in northern
India, and Sindh and North West Frontier
Province in Pakistan (Figure 2). In two of the
three other endemic countries, Afghanistan and
Niger, epidemiologic and virologic data
demonstrated highly focal endemic transmission,
as well as repeated importations from the “global
reservoir” with which they shared a border 
(i.e. Pakistan and Nigeria respectively). In Egypt
endemic transmission was highly localized.
In all of the endemic areas, the continued
transmission of polio is the result of vaccinators
having missed large numbers of young children
during NIDs and/or SNIDs which had been
designed to deliver supplementary OPV doses to
all children. In most of these areas, especially
within the densely populated, major reservoir
areas of Nigeria, India and Pakistan, this problem
is further compounded by very low routine
immunization coverage with OPV3, often less 
than 25%.
Figure 2: Wild poliovirus*, 1 January 2003 – 09 December 2003
7 Areas of endemic transmission of indigenous wild polioviruses at end-2003: Southern region in Afghanistan; greater Cairo and “rest of Egypt” in
Egypt; Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal in India; Niger; northeast, north-central, north-west and central zones of Nigeria; Baluchistan,

















































The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply the
expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Health Organization concerning
the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the
delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Dotted lines on maps represent approximate border
lines for which there may not yet be full agreement.
© WHO 2003. All rights reserved.
*Excludes viruses detected from environmental
surveillance and vaccine derived polioviruses.
Data in WHO HQ as of 09 Dec 2003.
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Although endemic polio transmission is now
geographically restricted, wild poliovirus
importations have continued to paralyse children
in polio-free areas. Between 1999 and mid-2003,
a total of 12 such importations were detected with
over 70 children paralysed in Africa, Asia, Europe,
and the Western Pacific. In the first nine months
of 2003 alone, virus from the northern Nigeria
reservoir reinfected Burkina Faso, Chad, Ghana,
Togo and part of Niger, as well as polio-free states
within Nigeria such as Lagos, requiring an inter-
national immunization response. To date, all such
polio outbreaks have eventually been controlled
through large-scale OPV mop-up operations,
though sometimes as late as six months after the
index case had been detected. In addition to the
risk of importations, during 2000–2002 a total of
28 polio cases in the Dominican Republic, Haiti,
Madagascar and the Philippines, confirmed the
real, though rare, risk of polio outbreaks due to
circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses
(cVDPVs). Although these cVDPV outbreaks
were readily stopped with OPV mop-up
operations, the capacity to detect and respond to
such events must be in place until well after the
use of OPV in routine immunization has stopped.
E x p e c t e d  R e s u l t s :
1. Intensified mass immunization activities in
endemic areas (iSNIDs or iNIDs8): The highest
priority for the Global Polio Eradication Initiative
is the interruption of wild poliovirus transmission
in the remaining endemic countries of Nigeria,
India, Pakistan, Niger, Egypt and Afghanistan.
Among the remaining geographic areas with
endemic transmission of indigenous wild
poliovirus,9 particular attention is required in the
five key reservoir states/provinces of Kano
(Nigeria), Uttar Pradesh and Bihar (India) and
Sindh and North West Frontier Province
(Pakistan). To stop transmission in all infected
areas as rapidly as possible, intensified activities
are planned to repeatedly vaccinate the large
cohorts of susceptible young children that rapidly
accumulate in these areas due to large populations,
high birth rates and very low routine
immunization coverage. Reaching over 90% of
8 iSNIDs: intensified subnational immunization days; iNIDs: intensified national immunization days.
9 See footnote 7.
*Assumes wild poliovirus is interrupted by end-2004. See Global Polio Eradication Initiative Estimated





























































at risk of importation: 
Table 1: Baseline NIDs and SNIDs planned for polio eradication 2004–2008*












































































children during intensified polio activities will
require:
■ direct oversight by the highest political and
health authorities in the country to ensure
accountability;
■ “mapping” of local political, religious,
traditional and community leaders to ensure
state/province, district and community level
advocacy efforts generate enhanced support
from influential opinion leaders;
■ detailed microplanning at the local level to
ensure that every household is identified,
mapped and visited by an immunization
team;
■ full engagement of local women’s groups
and other influential NGOs to ensure
sufficient female vaccinators with access to
all homes and communities;
■ enhanced communications strategies and
activities, based on epidemiologic and
programme data;
■ sufficient financing and, where appropriate,
innovative funding mechanisms, including
direct financing to peripheral level
government and nongovernmental
institutions, to ensure timely availability of
funds at the point of operations;
■ additional technical assistance from polio
partners to ensure sufficient national and
international expertise is available for
state/province and district planning and
monitoring. 
iSNIDs or iNIDs will be conducted one
month apart in series of 3–4 rounds, in all
remaining endemic states or provinces, until 12
months after the last indigenous case (Table 1).
The effectiveness of these intensified activities 
will be highly dependent on the presence of
quality acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance,
including very rapid processing of diagnostic
specimens and genetic characterization of isolated
viruses, to guide these activities.
2. Emergency response mop-ups to wild
poliovirus importations and/or cVDPVs: The
second priority will be to ensure that all polio-free
countries and areas treat the detection of an
imported wild poliovirus and/or cVDPV as a
public health emergency, with standard operating
procedures to mount a rapid and massive mop-up
response within four weeks of confirmation of such
a virus from a clinical case. To enhance national
capacity to initiate such a response, standard
operating procedures will be developed in each
country, as outlined in the requirements of the
global and regional certification commissions. At
the regional level, the polio partnership will target
its 2004 technical assistance to the rapid
preparation of these procedures in countries which
form epidemiologic blocks with the remaining
reservoir areas (e.g. west and central Africa). At
the global level, international requirements for the
reporting of circulating polioviruses will be
revised to enhance timeliness of their reporting.
Adequate reserves of financial and vaccine
resources are planned to facilitate emergency mop-
up responses. By 2007 the management of the
response to such events will be fully integrated
with existing WHO and UNICEF emergency
response mechanisms for other important
pathogens (e.g. yellow fever, meningitis).
3. Supplementary immunization in highest-
risk polio-free areas: The third priority of the
Global Polio Eradication Initiative will be to
prevent the re-establishment of wild poliovirus
transmission in polio-free areas, especially within
the endemic countries themselves. Consequently,
in addition to the iSNIDs at least two rounds of
iNIDs will continue to be conducted in each of the
endemic countries for two years after the last case
is detected. Two rounds of NIDs or SNIDs will
also be conducted in the limited number of polio-
free countries which are at particularly high risk of
re-establishing endemic transmission of imported
wild poliovirus due to their proximity to an
endemic area, large population size and/or
suboptimal OPV3 coverage. As of mid-2003, the
six large countries in which the re-establishment
of wild poliovirus transmission would be
particularly damaging were Angola, Bangladesh,
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia,
Nepal and the Sudan. As a result of the intense
polio transmission in northern Nigeria in 2003,
and its repeated spread into bordering countries,

















































Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire
Ghana and Togo. The NIDs or SNIDs in these
countries will continue to be planned until the last
case has been detected in the relevant reservoir
areas. Specific countries and areas requiring
additional SIAs will be regularly reviewed and
updated, depending on routine immunization
coverage, surveillance sensitivity, risk of
importations and other factors. Table 1 outlines
the proposed schedule of SIAs for these countries.
4. Enhanced routine immunization coverage
against polio: The fourth priority will be to
support the work of WHO and UNICEF,
especially within the Global Alliance for Vaccines
and Immunization (GAVI), to improve routine
immunization coverage. In polio-free areas
enhanced routine immunization coverage will be
central to limiting the spread of importations
and/or the emergence of cVDPVs. In endemic
areas improvements in routine OPV coverage will
enhance the impact of iNIDs, iSNIDs and 
mop-ups. The importance of ensuring a “birth
dose” of OPV will be reinforced. The Global Polio
Eradication Initiative will continue to identify for
GAVI those areas at highest risk of importations
and/or cVDPVs for its international and national
advocacy work. Polio-funded staff will continue to
work on routine immunization strengthening,
giving particular emphasis to transferring polio
lessons and experience to the effort to “Reach
Every District” (RED) in the areas at highest risk
of importations. Special attention will be given to
microplanning, logistics, social mobilization, and
monitoring and evaluation in the areas with low
OPV3 coverage (Table 2).
5. High quality surveillance and laboratories
(see also objective 2): To interrupt endemic
chains of wild poliovirus transmission,
importations and/or cVDPVs, high quality SIAs
must be guided by excellent surveillance globally
for circulating polioviruses. The highest
surveillance priority of the Global Polio
Table 2: Priority countries for improving OPV3 coverage to GAVI target*; WHO/UNICEF 














































































































































































































2 0 0 8I n d i c a t o r s
Number of endemic countries
Percentage of planned SIAs 
implemented in highest risk 
polio-free areas (Table 1)
Percentage of countries
achieving GAVI targets for
DTP3/OPV3**
Percentage of emergency 
mop-ups begun within four 




O b j e c t i v e  1 :  
I n t e r r u p t  P o l i o v i r u s  T r a n s m i s s i o n
I n d i c a t o r s  a n d  M i l e s t o n e s
* As of end-2003, one country is at particular risk of ongoing transmission into the first half of 2005.
** Based on the rate of progress which would be required to achieve the GAVI target: by 2010 or sooner, all countries
will have routine immunization coverage at 90% nationally with at least 80% coverage in every district. 
M a j o r  C h a l l e n g e s  t o  
t h e  I n t e r r u p t i o n  o f
P o l i o v i r u s
T r a n s m i s s i o n
This section provides further detail on the major
challenges to interrupting poliovirus transmission
globally; the potential financial implications 
of these challenges are outlined in the Global 
Polio Eradication Initiative Estimated External
Financial Resource Requirements, 2004–2008.
Interruption of wild poliovirus transmission
by the end of 2004:
The most important assumption underpinning
this Strategic Plan is that wild poliovirus
transmission will be interrupted globally by the
end of 2004 or, at the latest, in the first half of
2005. As of mid-2003, there was increasing
epidemiologic, programmatic and virologic
evidence that transmission would be interrupted
within 12 months in Egypt, Niger and
Afghanistan. The latter two countries, however,
would continue to be at high risk of cross-border
importations until transmission stopped in the
adjacent reservoir countries of Nigeria and
Pakistan. Although there is a much higher risk of
indigenous polio continuing beyond end-2004 in
Nigeria, India and Pakistan, data from all three
countries demonstrate that transmission could
stop within that period if there is sufficient
political will, oversight and accountability. Large
areas of all three countries have been free 
of indigenous poliovirus transmission for over 
12 months, demonstrating that the strategies can
work rapidly when properly implemented in these
M i l e s t o n e s
Eradication Initiative in 2004–2005 will be to
achieve certification-standard surveillance at the
national level in the 19 countries which did not
achieve this level in 2003 in the three endemic
regions (Table 3). Substantial work will also be
required to identify and close gaps in AFP
performance at the subnational level in the large
countries which are currently or recently endemic.
Further attention will be given to increasing the
speed with which surveillance and laboratory
results from “hot cases” are communicated to those
responsible for decisions on the timing and extent
of SIAs. The polio partnership will support national
efforts to improve AFP surveillance through the

















































countries. However, successfully building on this
close political oversight will require the continued
development of appropriate local responses to
specific challenges as they arise, such as the anti-
OPV campaign in northern Nigeria in 2003, the
limited access to conservative tribal groups in
parts of Pakistan and the persistent polio
immunity gap among underserved populations in
India. In those limited endemic areas which are
still affected by conflict or insecurity, strategy
implementation will continue to depend on
establishing, at least temporarily, a safe working
environment.
In India the marked increase in the 
number (6) and quality of annual NID/SNID
rounds following the 2002 outbreak has
substantially reduced the immunity gap10 in
children from underserved  communities (from
42% in 2002 to just 13% in 2003) and, in 2003,
was associated with the lowest mid-year levels of
transmission ever. With continued attention to
reaching very young children and underserved
populations in late 2003, particularly in the
northern states of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and West
Bengal, transmission could be interrupted in
2004. Of particular concern is western Uttar
Pradesh, the only area in India where transmission
has never been interrupted and where substantial
numbers of children are still missed during SIAs.
Major challenges to achieving the necessary level
of SIA quality include ensuring programme
continuity given the ongoing changes among
senior health and political authorities in the
country, heightening district level accountability
for the performance of immunization teams, and
expanding the ongoing efforts to reach all children
in underserved populations. This work in endemic
areas will need to be matched by faster, larger,
high-quality mop-up responses to importations
into polio-free areas, such as occurred in West
Bengal in 2002 and Andhra Pradesh and
Karnataka in 2003.
In Pakistan, a sufficient number of
NIDs/SNIDs have been planned to interrupt
transmission by the end of 2004. However,
ongoing gaps in SIA quality, particularly in
districts of northern Sindh and the North West
Frontier Province (NWFP), could leave a
substantial number of children unimmunized and
compromise the impact of these activities. The
mid-2003 decision of the President of Pakistan to
personally monitor progress should substantially
improve accountability in these areas. Because of
the gaps in the formal health services in these
geographic areas, further improvements in SIA
quality require enhanced engagement of the local
political leadership to mobilize the non-health
transportation, human and communications
resources necessary to reach every child. Of
particular importance will be fully implementing
the policy of having at least one woman (e.g. the
local Lady Health Worker) on every vaccination
team to ensure all communities and households
can be visited to search for highest risk,
unimmunized, very young children during
iSNIDs. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA) will require special attention to build the
necessary oversight and accountability by local
political and community leaders.
As of mid-2003, the greatest risk to the end-
2004 global target was Nigeria, due to the
intensity of transmission in the northern states
and the spread to recently polio-free areas both
within and outside the country. This exacerbation
of transmission was caused by a combination of
substantial, ongoing gaps in SIA quality and the
cancellation of key immunization activities in
late-2003. Of particular concern at mid-2003
were data demonstrating that the polio immunity
gap among children in some northern states,
particularly Kano, was still >50%. Rapidly
closing this immunity gap will require: 
(1) enhancing the microplanning, social
mobilization, logistics and vaccination team
supervision during SIAs, (2) addressing ongoing
community concerns as to the safety of OPV
following widespread rumours and comments to
that affect, and (3) ensuring state and district level
authorities are fully engaged in these activities. To
facilitate this work, the polio partners have
enhanced their technical assistance to the key
states in coordination with federal authorities and
provided extensive background materials to
address concerns over vaccine safety.
Frequency of circulating vaccine-derived
poliovirus (cVDPV) outbreaks:
The second major assumption underpinning this
plan is that cVDPVs will continue to be rare
events requiring only intermittent OPV mop-up
campaigns to stop transmission rather than

















































extensive, preventive SIAs to limit their
emergence. This assumption is based on the
available data, primarily from the global AFP
surveillance and polio laboratory network, which
has detected an average of only one cVDPV
outbreak each year in the period 1999–2002, with
a total of 28 cases. During the period 1999 to 
June 2003, the laboratory network screened over
11 000 polioviruses worldwide, 7000 of which
were Sabin-related, usually isolated as a
coincidental finding during the investigation of
AFP cases (29 were from the 3 cVDPV outbreaks,
3 were from iVDPVs and 12 were “other” VDPVs
of ambiguous origin). 
Although cVDPVs appear to be rare events,
the 3 recent episodes in Hispaniola, Madagascar
and the Philippines have occurred under
circumstances which could become more prevalent
in the period 2004–2008 and thus lead to
additional outbreaks. For example, common to all
of these episodes was the absence of indigenous
wild poliovirus, low routine OPV3 coverage 
and the cessation of supplementary OPV
immunization activities. With the revised tactical
approach in 2003 to interrupt wild poliovirus
transmission, an increasing number of countries
with low OPV3 coverage will stop polio SIAs in
2004–2005. It is anticipated that this decline in
SIAs coverage will be in part compensated by an
increase in routine OPV3 as GAVI enhances its
efforts to increase coverage as laid out in its
Strategic Framework for that period. Further
emphasis will be placed on the inclusion of the
birth dose of OPV, particularly in low coverage
areas. In addition, there will be a heightening of
surveillance and closer scrutiny of the VDPVs
which are detected through AFP and other
surveillance activities, to better understand the
risk factors for, and frequency of cVDPVs. 
Consequently, although the incidence of
cVDPV events could increase as a result of the
reduction in SIAs globally, it is anticipated that
they will continue to be rare. However, the global
TCG will by 2005 revisit its recommendations on
the need for additional SIAs to prevent the

















































4 . 2 O b j e c t i v e  2 :  
A c h i e v e  C e r t i f i c a t i o n  o f  G l o b a l
P o l i o  E r a d i c a t i o n
S t r a t e g i c  A p p r o a c h :
In 1997, the Global Commission for the
Certification of the Eradication of Poliomyelitis
(GCC) finalized the criteria for certifying whether
the goal of polio eradication is achieved. In
summary, certification of the interruption of wild
poliovirus transmission is conducted on a regional
basis. Each of the 6 Regional Certification
Commissions (RCCs) could consider certification
only when all countries in that area had submitted
the appropriate documentation demonstrating the
absence of wild poliovirus transmission for at least
three consecutive years in the presence of excellent
surveillance. The GCC further stated that for
endemic and recently endemic countries, the
notification and investigation of AFP cases would
be the accepted standard for the purposes of
certification. AFP surveillance would be of
“certification standard” if three performance
criteria were achieved. First, the system should
detect at least one case of non-polio AFP for every
100 000 population aged less than 15 years.
Second, two adequate diagnostic specimens12
should be collected from at least 80% of AFP
cases. Third, all specimens should be processed at
a WHO-accredited laboratory. 
For certification of global polio eradication, the
GCC established the further criteria that all
facilities holding wild poliovirus infectious and
potentially infectious materials must have
implemented appropriate biocontainment
measures. The process of laboratory containment
was developed through international consultation.
A draft action plan was widely distributed for
comment in 1998 prior to publication as the
Global Action Plan for Laboratory Containment of
Wild Polioviruses (WHO/V&B/99.32) in 1999,
with a second edition in 2003.13 The plan outlines
phased activities to minimize the risk of
reintroduction of wild polioviruses from
diagnostic and research laboratories to the
community. Phase I requires all countries to
conduct a national search for laboratories and to
create an inventory of those identified as holding
wild poliovirus or potentially infectious materials.
RCCs have included phase I activities as a
component of the regional certification
requirements. Phase II requires that laboratories
listed on national inventories destroy wild
poliovirus materials or maintain them under
appropriate biosafety conditions. For
manufacturers of IPV produced from wild
polioviruses, specific guidelines defining biosafety
requirements following the interruption of
transmission of wild polioviruses were developed
and finalized in 2003 through a collaborative
process with national regulatory authorities and
biosafety professionals. Global certification will
require the implementation of these requirements
in all countries where IPV production continues.
THE process for certification of the global eradication of poliomyelitis has been validated through the experience of thethree WHO regions that had been certified polio-free by end-2003. The global certification process is threatened,
however, by ongoing gaps in surveillance quality in the three remaining endemic regions, declining surveillance sensitivity
within the three regions that have already been certified, and incomplete implementation of the Global Action Plan for
the Laboratory Containment of Wild Polioviruses (GAP II). In addition to interruption of wild poliovirus transmission
worldwide, achieving global certification by 2008 requires rapidly addressing persistent surveillance gaps in 
19 countries of Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean and South-East Asia.11 Countries in regions which have already been
certified must maintain certification-standard surveillance and high immunity levels against poliovirus. All countries
must have established national plans of action for rapidly responding to wild poliovirus importations and cVDPVs and
have completed Phase II containment activities. Vaccine manufacturers producing inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV)
from wild poliovirus strains must have implemented enhanced biosafety procedures.
11 Of these 19 countries, 7 had a population of less than 1 million people and were unlikely to sustain undetected wild poliovirus transmission.
12 Adequate diagnostic specimens: Two stool specimens collected at least 24 hours apart, within 14 days of onset of paralysis and received in good
condition at the laboratory.


















































S i t u a t i o n  A n a l y s i s :
As required by the GCC, RCCs have been
established to oversee the process of reviewing
national surveillance and containment
documentation in each of the six WHO regions.
National certification committees (NCCs) have
been established in all countries to collate and
verify the necessary information.14 As of mid-2003,
three of the six WHO regions had been certified
polio-free. These regions included the 
46 countries of the Americas in 1994, the 
34 countries of the Western Pacific in 2000 and 
51 countries of Europe in 2002. Although the
three remaining “endemic” regions have achieved
“certification-standard” surveillance at the
regional level, 19 of the 82 countries in those
regions had yet to achieve this standard at the
national level during 2003 (10 in Africa, 7 in the
Eastern Mediterranean, 2 in South-East Asia)
(Table 3). Within a number of other countries the
quality of surveillance was not uniform and did not
meet the certification criteria for high quality
subnational data. Figure 3 summarizes the status
of national AFP surveillance indicators in endemic
and certified regions. Figure 4 illustrates the
worldwide network of 145 virology laboratories
which forms the backbone of global AFP
surveillance,15 arranged in a hierarchical structure
of national (123), regional (15) and global
specialized (7) facilities. High quality performance
is assured through annual proficiency testing, a
formal accreditation programme, and ongoing
evaluation using standard indicators. In 2002,
99% of the network laboratories were accredited
by WHO; 100% of specimens were tested in a
WHO-accredited laboratory by referring samples
from countries where facilities were not accredited.
In mid-1999, the WHA urged all Member
States “to begin the process leading to the
laboratory containment of wild poliovirus”.16 As of
mid-2003, 148 (68%) countries and territories
had begun or completed their listing of
14 For the very limited number of geographic areas without a recognized national health authority (e.g. Somalia), the GCC has requested that
WHO and UNICEF assume responsibility for coordinating the collection, verification and submission of the documentation required for
certification.
15 The number and distribution of network laboratories are: 8 in the Americas, 16 in Africa, 12 in the Eastern Mediterranean, 48 in Europe, 17 in
South-East Asia and 43 in the Western Pacific.


















































































West Bank and Gaza
Bhutan
Maldives*
Table 3: Countries not achieving one or more of the AFP Performance Indicators 
required for certification-standard surveillance in 2003 (data available as of 4 November 2003)
Region
Comoros, Mauritius, Reunion, Saint Helena, Seychelles and Timor-Leste did not report AFP cases in 2003 due to small populations.
Data in HQ as of 4 November 2003.
Red indicates targets not achieved.
Green indicates targets achieved during 2002.
*Total population <1 million, unlikely to have sustained, undetected indigenous transmission of wild polioviruses.
Population Data source: United Nations Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population




















































biomedical laboratories as part of the Phase I
containment activities. This number included
several large industrialized countries such as
Australia, Canada, Germany and the United States
of America. Worldwide, over 100 000 laboratories
had been identified for surveying and 80 countries
(37%) had finalized an inventory of laboratories
storing wild poliovirus materials. For IPV
production facilities using wild poliovirus at these
sites, consensus has been reached on the need for
BSL-3/polio level containment in all existing
facilities, with implementation and verification
activities planned for completion in 2007–2008.
E x p e c t e d  R e s u l t s :
1. “Certification-standard” surveillance: 
a) Polio-endemic regions: The highest priority
will be to achieve and sustain certification-
standard surveillance at the national level in the
19 countries of the endemic regions which did
not achieve this level in 2002. Substantial work
will also be required to identify and close gaps in
AFP performance at the subnational level in the
large countries which are currently or recently
endemic (Table 3). The polio partnership will
support national efforts to improve AFP
surveillance through targeted technical assistance
at the national and subnational levels and, where
necessary and appropriate, external financing of
equipment and operating costs. Attention will be
given to improving the speed of surveillance and
virologic data analysis and feedback at the
country and regional levels, especially to meet the
performance indicators for emergency response
mop-ups in all regions. Joint national/
international AFP surveillance reviews will
continue to guide improvements.
b) Regions certified as polio-free: Assisted by
RCCs and National Certification Committees
(NCCs), countries in certified regions should
sustain polio-free status by maintaining
certification-quality surveillance, achieving the
highest possible immunity levels against wild
poliovirus, and developing plans of action for
rapidly reacting to importations of wild poliovirus.
Priority will be given to identifying high-risk
countries or areas where AFP surveillance
sensitivity has markedly declined and/or from
where enhanced AFP or supplementary
surveillance data may be required for the purposes
of global certification. From 2005-2006,
partnership resources will increasingly be targeted
to address those areas. At the same time, increased
attention will be given to integrating AFP
reporting into appropriate national surveillance
mechanisms, if this intergration has not already
been done, or expanding the AFP surveillance
capacity to detect and investigate other diseases of
public health importance (see section 4.4).
2. Global access to a WHO-accredited
laboratory: The priority in this area of work will
be to reduce the time required for intratypic
differentiation (ITD) results to be available from
endemic areas; ITD capacity will be established in
all countries with major poliovirus reservoirs. For
all other areas the priority will be to sustain,
through global certification and OPV cessation,
the international capacity that now exists to
process all specimens from AFP cases in WHO-
accredited laboratories. Consequently, emphasis
will be given to maintaining rather than
expanding the existing laboratory network, with
targeted support to the small number of network
laboratories which have yet to achieve
accreditation. Special advocacy will be required,
particularly from 2006 onward, to ensure that the
national public health institutions which house
the global polio laboratory network, but have a
much broader mandate, continue to designate
sufficient human resources, facilities and
equipment to polio eradication work. During this
same period, it is anticipated that the work of the
polio laboratory network will actually increase, as it
accommodates demands for supplementary
virologic data in advance of global certification.
These data requirements (e.g. targeted
environmental surveillance) will be defined with
the GCC during the period 2004–2005.
3. Containment of wild polioviruses and
VDPVs: The priority in this area will be the
further dissemination and national level
implementation of the activities outlined in the
second edition of the Global Action Plan for
Laboratory Containment of Wild Polioviruses (2003).
Particular attention will be given to completing
the laboratory survey and inventory activities in
all polio-free countries and preparing for
implementation of phase II laboratory
containment activities prior to global
certification. From the end of 2005, the date by
which wild poliovirus transmission should have

















































Figure 3: AFP Performance Indicators 1 January 2003 – 25 November 2003
Figure 4: Global laboratory network for polio eradication, 2002
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply
the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Health Organization
concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or
concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Dotted lines on maps repre-
sent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement.
© WHO 2003. All rights reserved. Data in WHO HQ as of 25 November 2003.
Adequate stool collection rate
Non-polio AFP rate
< 60% 60%-80%
80% No AFP Surveillance
< 0.5 0.5 -1
1 No AFP Surveillance
The designations employed and the presentation of material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the World Health Organization concerning the legal status of any country,
territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Dotted lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement.



















































containment activities will be initiated in all
countries, with particular emphasis on large
industrialized countries which contain the largest
stocks of wild poliovirus. 
BSL-3/polio containment will be completed in
facilities producing IPV from wild poliovirus,
followed by the necessary validation activities and
licensure by national regulatory authorities.
During this period the GCC, in consultation with
appropriate biosafety and other expert bodies, will
establish the national, regional and global level
procedures needed for reviewing and verifying the
containment documentation submitted by each
country as part of the certification process.
Particular attention will also be given to verifying
the thoroughness of national laboratory surveys to
identify potentially polio-infected materials, 
such as specimen collections from places and
periods when wild poliovirus was endemic. The
process for developing long-term containment
requirements for wild and attenuated poliovirus
strains is outlined in section 4.3.
4. Completion of the certification processes:
The priority in this area will be to support the
work of RCCs in the three remaining endemic
regions as they complete the process of training
NCCs and then collect, review and decide on
national documentation through an intensive
series of consultations. Particular attention will be
given to supporting the work of the RCC for
Africa, given the large number of countries for
which it is responsible. At the global level, by the
end of 2005 the GCC will seek to have finalized a
number of issues related to its operations,
particularly (a) the additional data that will be
required for global certification from the three
regions which had been certified polio-free by
end-2002, (b) the extent and role of environmental
surveillance as a supplementary strategy prior to
global certification, and (c) the mechanisms/
procedures for reviewing and verifying
documentation on containment of laboratory
stocks and IPV production. WHO and partners
will continue to support the work of the
commissions by convening or facilitating the
necessary meetings, expert consultations, field
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O b j e c t i v e  2 :  
A c h i e v e  C e r t i f i c a t i o n  o f  G l o b a l  P o l i o
E r a d i c a t i o n
I n d i c a t o r s  a n d  M i l e s t o n e s

















































S t r a t e g i c  A p p r o a c h :
The broad policy objective for the Global OPV
Cessation Phase is to minimize the risks of paralytic
poliomyelitis for current and future generations at
the lowest possible cost. The cessation of routine
immunization against smallpox following the
eradication of that pathogen in 1977 established an
expectation that immunization against polio can
also stop after the interruption of wild poliovirus
transmission and the containment of laboratory
stocks and vaccine production facilities. The
smallpox experience has offered important insights
into the range of issues that arise in the
development of such policy. However, the issue is
substantially more complex for polio due to a
variety of reasons, including differences in the
characteristics of the vaccines used and in the
geopolitics of the era in which each eradication
campaign has been conducted.
Consequently, the focus of this area of work has
been to first define and quantify the risks of
paralytic poliomyelitis following global
certification, due to either the continued use of the
OPV or the continued handling of wild polioviruses
or potentially infectious materials. An agenda of
research and programme work was established to
inform this risk framework and to study potential
strategies for their mitigation. Particular attention
was given to defining the financial costs, economic
implications, technical and regulatory feasibility,
and operational practicality of each potential
strategy. Recognizing the implications of this
evolving work for polio eradication stakeholders, as
well as the international health community, a
consultative process was initiated to better
understand these influences. A communications
programme of work was established to ensure the
wide dissemination of relevant scientific and
programmatic data on both the risks following
certification and their management as additional
information became available.
In April 2003, the global TCG stated that
stopping OPV would require new policies in four
interrelated areas: (1) routine immunization, 
(2) detection and notification of circulating
polioviruses as public health emergencies, 
(3) polio vaccine stockpiles and outbreak response
mechanisms, and (4) long-term biocontainment of
all poliovirus strains.
S i t u a t i o n  A n a l y s i s :
In 1998, a WHO-convened expert consultation on
the scientific basis for stopping polio
immunization concluded that given the rare but
4 . 3 O b j e c t i v e  3 :  
D e v e l o p  P r o d u c t s  f o r  t h e  G l o b a l  
O P V C e s s a t i o n  P h a s e
SINCE 2000, polio outbreaks caused by vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs) have conclusively demonstrated thatthe continued use of the OPV for routine immunization could compromise the goal of eradicating all paralytic disease
due to circulating polioviruses. To minimize the long-term risks associated with OPV, the world must stop the routine use
of this vaccine as soon as possible after global certification, while surveillance sensitivity and population immunity are
high. Although trivalent OPV will continue to be the vaccine of choice for routine immunization for the Global Polio
Eradication Initiative up to 2009, stopping OPV requires the development of a range of other products during the period
2004–2008. A third edition of the Global Action Plan for the Laboratory Containment of Wild Polioviruses will be
needed by 2006, specifying the biosafety requirements for wild polioviruses, VDPVs and Sabin-strains in the Global
OPV Cessation Phase of the programme (i.e. 2009 & beyond). Monovalent OPV (mOPV) will need to be licensed and
stockpiled to complement or even replace the current “rolling stockpile” of trivalent OPV. The manufacture of IPV from
Sabin strains (S-IPV) will be encouraged, as will the production and licensing of appropriate IPV-containing
combination vaccines for those middle- or low-income countries which might choose to introduce such a vaccine. Because
of the long-term risks of wild poliovirus re-introduction, the ongoing need for an OPV stockpile, and the probable future
production of S-IPV, OPV production capacity will be needed indefinitely. During this period, every country must plan
for the cessation of OPV use and decide whether or not to introduce IPV; countries deciding to introduce IPV must make
provision for its procurement. Recognizing the challenges to developing and introducing new products, this work will be

















































predictable risk of vaccine-associated paralytic
poliomyelitis (VAPP), the use of OPV for routine
immunization should eventually stop once wild
poliovirus transmission was interrupted, wild
poliovirus stocks were properly contained and
there was assurance that VDPV circulation would
not persist. Following the confirmation in 2000
that VDPVs could indeed persist, circulate and
cause polio outbreaks, subsequent consultations
identified three potential options for stopping
routine OPV immunization: coordinated cessation
of OPV globally (possibly following immunization
campaigns in low coverage areas), phased
replacement of OPV with IPV for routine
immunization (for at least an interim period), and
the development and introduction of a new polio
vaccine for routine immunization. In the same year
an expert review of new vaccines for the Global
OPV Cessation Phase outlined substantial manu-
facturing challenges and regulatory hurdles to
introducing a new poliovirus vaccine. Since then
the polio research agenda has focused on the
feasibility and effectiveness of the first two options.
In 2001, the global TCG established an ad hoc
Committee for Poliomyelitis Research to provide
additional oversight of the ongoing research for
post-certification policy development. By late-2002
this research had progressed to the point where the
global TCG could endorse a framework of the risks
of paralytic poliomyelitis after global interruption
of wild poliovirus transmission. The framework
classifies these risks into two categories: those due
to the continued use of OPV and those due to future
improper handling of wild polioviruses. The
specific risks within both categories were defined,
with working estimates of the frequency and
potential burden of disease associated with each
(Table 4). From 2001, a briefing kit on the
potential risks, and post-certification policy in
general, has been widely disseminated among
national health authorities, polio partners, other
stakeholders and interested bodies. These materials
were updated in 2003 as additional information on
risks following certification became available and
the processes for policy development were further
clarified. In 2003, WHO also published a position
paper on the introduction of IPV into OPV-using
countries to assist the growing number of countries,
particularly in polio-free regions, which were
considering or implementing a change to IPV for
routine immunization, primarily due to national
assessments that the risk of VAPP was increasingly
unacceptable.
Among the key developments in the area of
public consultation was a 2002 meeting at which a
wide range of policy-makers from diverse
backgrounds reaffirmed the international
expectation, particularly among low- and middle-
income countries, that routine polio immunization
would eventually stop. Of equal importance was the
September 2003 international consultation on
vaccine-derived polioviruses which concluded that
VDPVs posed a real risk to the global goal of
eliminating paralytic poliomyelitis due to
circulating polioviruses. That meeting further
concluded that this risk would continue as long as
OPV continued to be used, particularly in areas of
low routine immunization coverage.
In 2003, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative
was operating with a rolling stockpile of 50 million
doses of trivalent OPV for responding to wild
poliovirus outbreaks and cVDPVs, with a planned
expansion to 75 million doses for the period
2006–2008 (as outlined below, prior to the cessation
of routine OPV immunization a significantly larger
stockpile of mOPV will be required). By late-2003,
as a result of the above-mentioned scientific
research, programme work and consultations, the
Global Polio Eradication Initiative was working
toward the cessation of routine immunization with
OPV as soon as possible after global certification.
This goal required enhancing the work to license
mOPV for the vaccine stockpile, as mOPV would
allow a type-specific response to cVDPVs or
containment failures and thus limit the number of
serotypes reintroduced to human populations. The
implications of OPV cessation also led to an
























1 in 2.4 million doses
of OPV administered




19 cases since 1963
with 2 continuing 











per year (total of
29 cases in three
years)
<1 case per year
No cases
* Study and data collection is ongoing for all categories 
** Under current polio immunization policies 


















































polio vaccine stockpile and response activities
within WHO and UNICEF and to evaluate further
the potential large-scale production of IPV from
attenuated (e.g. Sabin) poliovirus strains. Finally, as
WHO-coordinated research had indicated that more
potent poliovirus antiviral compounds could be
developed, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative
continued to explore the potential role such
products might have in enhancing flexibility in
outbreak response scenarios.
E x p e c t e d  R e s u l t s :
1. Strategy for cessation of routine
immunization with OPV: The priorities in this
area of work will be to (a) refine existing estimates
of the frequency and risk associated with each type
of VDPV which could emerge with OPV-cessation,
including the geographic areas or demographic
groups at highest risk (especially for cVDPV), 
(b) establish standard strategies and operating
procedures for responding to  circulating poliovirus
after OPV cessation, (c) develop local strategies to
reduce specific VDPV risks (i.e. iVDPVs,17 VDPVs
in orphanages), (d) evaluate seroconversion rates,
operational feasibility, costs and production
capacity of IPV, alone and in combination, for low-
and middle-income settings, (e) maintain the
capacity to restart large-scale OPV-use if required,
and (f) define the most cost-effective strategy for
the coordinated cessation of OPV. Because
minimizing the risk of VDPV emergence and
spread at the time of OPV cessation requires high
surveillance sensitivity and population immunity,
these priorities must be sufficiently addressed by
2006 to allow implementation to begin.18 Such a
timeframe is needed to ensure that those countries
which will want to switch to IPV on an interim or
long-term basis are able to secure the necessary
vaccine and financing. To facilitate decisions on
post-OPV vaccination policies, from 2004
onwards, there will be extensive consultation,
particularly with OPV-using countries, on the risks
associated with OPV cessation. Further materials
will be developed to assist countries in deciding
whether or not to introduce IPV and if so how (e.g.
guidelines, policy directives). Standard protocols
will be implemented to study some of these
experiences. Additional work will be conducted to
ensure sufficient IPV capacity. Given the risks
associated with IPV production using wild
polioviruses, the development of IPV products
based on attenuated (e.g. Sabin) strains of
poliovirus will be encouraged.
2. Detection and notification of circulating
polioviruses: With the elimination of wild
poliovirus transmission globally, the detection of
any circulating poliovirus must be treated as an
international public health emergency to ensure it
is contained with a rapid response. Consequently,
routine AFP reporting and investigation will need
to be supplemented by additional measures to
facilitate the rapid detection and immediate
notification of such events to national and
international health authorities. AFP reporting
will also need to be aligned with other WHO
activities aimed at identifying events of
international public health importance. Enhanced
surveillance will be particularly important to
detect potential cVDPVs, during and
immediately after OPV cessation. Within one year
of the last case of wild poliovirus, the reporting of
any circulating poliovirus will be incorporated
into existing mechanisms for dealing with events
of international public health importance, such as
the WHO International Health Regulations and
the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network
(GOARN). The ongoing polio research agenda
will continue to explore new diagnostics, tools and
strategies for surveillance following global
certification, including the potential role of
targeted environmental sampling.
3. Polio vaccine stockpiles and their
management: By the end of 2003 the
international rolling stockpile of trivalent OPV
for responding to wild poliovirus importations
and/or cVDPVs consisted of 50 million doses of
trivalent OPV. This stockpile will grow to 
75 million doses as supplementary immunization
campaigns are phased out in the period
2006–2008. Both the number of doses and range
of polio vaccines in this stockpile will expand in
advance of the cessation of OPV for routine
immunization. The number of doses required for
the stockpile over time will be calculated using a
combination of national immunization policy and
coverage data and modelling of the possible spread
of reintroduced wild poliovirus after OPV
immunization has stopped. As noted above,
mOPV will be required to ensure a type-specific
17 iVDPVs = individuals with primary immunodeficiency syndromes who are long-term excretors of vaccine-derived polioviruses (i.e. > 6–12 months).
18 The experience from polio-free regions demonstrates that both surveillance sensitivity and polio immunization coverage begin to decline soon

















































response to cVDPVs or containment failures. IPV
stocks may be required for country(ies) which have
chosen to forego routine immunization against
polio but are considered at risk of due to a cVDPV
or containment failure in another country. OPV
stocks and production capacity will need to be
maintained in case routine immunization against
polio must be reinstituted globally. The priorities
in this area of work are the licensure of mOPV,
finalization of the target number of stockpile doses
for each vaccine during OPV cessation (and how
these will change over time relative to population
immunity), long-term containment requirements
for IPV and OPV production, and the
development of sustainable operating procedures
to govern the maintenance and use of the
stockpiles. The Global Polio Eradication Initiative
will also continue its work to support the
development of candidate poliovirus antivirals and
public health strategies for their use which might
enhance the flexibility of outbreak response
options.
4. Long-term containment of poliovirus
stocks: Following global certification,
containment issues become more complex as the
biosafety requirements for the handling of all
poliovirus strains are increased. Wild and vaccine-
derived polioviruses in particular will need to be
handled similar to other serious pathogens which
are under strict containment. In the period
2004–2005 a third edition of the Global Action
Plan for the Laboratory Containment of Wild
Polioviruses (GAP III) will be developed to deal
with containment in the Global OPV Cessation
Phase. The development of this plan will be used
to establish international consensus on the
timeframe and mechanisms for ensuring that the
containment requirements for laboratory stocks of
wild poliovirus and VDPVs are appropriate to the
risks. The plan will also be used to define the
additional requirements, in advance of OPV
cessation, needed to protect against silent infection
of production staff in sites which manufacture IPV.
In contrast to GAP II, GAP III will also be used to
establish consensus on the relevant biosafety levels
for handling Sabin and Sabin-derived poliovirus
strains during the Global OPV Cessation Phase.
Requirements will be developed for laboratories
and vaccine production sites, including those
which produce IPV from well-characterized
attenuated strains. During the period from 2006
onward, tools and capacity will be developed for
ensuring that containment requirements are
maintained in the long term in all laboratories and
vaccine production facilities that hold polioviruses.
The longterm monitoring of containment
implementation will be aligned with the processes
already in place for other pathogens which are
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* IHR = International Health Regulations; GOARN = Global Outbreak and Alert Response Network.
O b j e c t i v e  3 :  
D e v e l o p  P r o d u c t s  f o r  t h e  G l o b a l  O P V
C e s s a t i o n  P h a s e
I n d i c a t o r s  a n d  M i l e s t o n e s

















































4 . 4 O b j e c t i v e  4 :  
M a i n s t r e a m  t h e  G l o b a l  P o l i o
E r a d i c a t i o n  I n i t i a t i v e
S t r a t e g i c  A p p r o a c h :
Polio eradication has relied heavily on three major
activities: supplementary immunization
campaigns, active surveillance with laboratory
investigation of cases, and heightened partnership
coordination. Throughout the course of the
Global Polio Eradication Initiative, substantial
effort has been made to use these activities, as
well as the resources of the Global Polio
Eradication Initiative, to improve the delivery of
other health services, where appropriate and
feasible. 
In the area of SIAs (e.g. NIDs), the emphasis
has been on (a) adding other interventions which
were epidemiologically appropriate, operationally
feasible and could be continued through routine
immunization contacts, (b) improving routine
immunization services by refurbishing the
physical infrastructure (e.g. cold chain), updating
health worker training, building data analysis
capacity and reinstituting supervisory systems,
and (c) increasing community demand for, and
awareness of, other health services, particularly
routine immunization, through massive social
mobilization efforts. The range of interventions
that could be added to polio campaigns, however,
was often limited by the recruitment of large
numbers of community helpers with minimum
training in health service delivery. Consequently,
the greatest attention was given to vitamin A
supplements, which did not require extensive
training or an injection and the delivery of which
had already been linked to routine immunization
contacts. In the area of surveillance, two general
approaches have been taken to developing the
capacity needed for polio eradication in a way
which strengthened surveillance in general. In
places with strong disease detection and
notification, AFP reporting was integrated, if
possible, into that system. In places without such
capacity, AFP surveillance was established as a
framework for a national integrated disease
surveillance system. In the area of partnership
coordination, management and support, the
specific mechanisms which were developed, such
as interagency coordinating committees (ICCs),
technical advisory groups (TAGs) and the
Advisory Group on Communication for
Immunization and Polio Eradication, included in
their mandates the strengthening of routine
immunization.
To implement the polio eradication activities,
the polio partnership invested heavily in human
resources, physical infrastructure, and
institutional arrangements. Mainstreaming this
investment into national immunization and
surveillance systems will be critical to ensuring
that the experience, lessons and capacity
developed through polio eradication continue 
to benefit these areas, especially the “United
Nations General Assembly Special Session/World
THE Global Polio Eradication Initiative has supported the delivery of other health services, particularly since the mid-1990s, through such activities as vitamin A supplementation, integrated disease surveillance, refurbishment of
routine immunization services, and, most recently, country-level implementation of the activities of the Global Alliance
for Vaccines and Immunization (e.g. new vaccine introduction; immunization services strengthening). During the period
2004-2008, the polio partnership will accelerate the ‘mainstreaming’ of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative to
optimize these broader benefits and to institutionalize the longterm functions of the polio programme. First, the ongoing
work to transition or integrate the substantial polio-funded human resources, physical infrastructure and institutional
arrangements into other disease control, surveillance and response activities will be enhanced to sustain the broader benefits
of the international investment in polio eradication. This work will also minimize the risks that the conclusion of the
Global Polio Eradication Initiative might pose for other programmes which rely on its infrastructure. Secondly, the
longterm work of polio eradication, particularly in the areas of containment, surveillance, stockpiles and response, will
be fully incorporated into existing, sustainable, national, WHO and UNICEF mechanisms and structures that have
been established for other important pathogens (NOTE: the relevant milestones for mainstreaming these longterm functions

















































Fit for Children” and GAVI goals of increasing
routine immunization coverage19 and the global
measles mortality reduction targets.20 Linkages
have also been pursued to transfer the polio
experience to the scaling-up of other important
interventions, particularly those contributing to
millennium development goals (MDGs). 
As outlined under Objective 3, in the late
1990s the Global Polio Eradication Initiative
began working to ensure that longterm polio-
related activities could eventually be incorporated
into existing mechanisms that deal with other
serious pathogens. For example, since 1997-1998
the WHO Biosafety Advisory Group (BAG) that
provides guidance on general international
biosafety policy as well as specific expertise in
areas such as smallpox, has assisted the
development of the global action plans for
laboratory containment of wild polioviruses. In
2002, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative
began discussing the incorporation of polio into
the International Health Regulations (IHR), and
since 2003 the Global Outbreak Alert and
Response Network (GOARN) has been formally
involved in the tracking of, and response to, polio
outbreaks.
The longterm maintenance of polio diagnostic
laboratory capacity will be particularly important,
but also challenging, due to the increasing rarity
of the disease and decreasing relevance to national
health priorities. Consequently, opportunities are
being explored to sustain this national capacity by
better intergrating its basic functions with that for
either pathogens, while maintaining sufficient
international specialized centers for poliovirus.
S i t u a t i o n  A n a l y s i s :
By mid-2003, the Global Polio Eradication
Initiative had made a substantial impact on the
capacity to address other health priorities in many
countries. In all WHO regions, technical
oversight bodies for polio eradication, known as
technical consultative/advisory groups (TCGs/
TAGs),21 were being used to address the broader
immunization agenda. Polio-initiated, country-
level ICCs became the cornerstone of GAVI’s
process for providing support and are the model
for the Country Coordination Mechanism (CCM)
used by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria (GFATM). As early as
2001, 91% of the international polio-funded
personnel and 100% of the national personnel
were already spending an average of 44% and 22%
of their time, respectively, on other immunization
and health issues in the countries in which they
worked.22 During the five-year period 1996–2000,
the polio eradication partnership invested an
estimated 20% (i.e. US$ 200 million) of its
budget on equipment for routine immunization
and surveillance. In Africa alone, as much as 30%
of the routine cold chain was replaced with polio
funding.
Since 1998, the inclusion of vitamin A
supplements in NIDs has averted an estimated
1.25 million childhood deaths and strengthened
the links between immunization contacts and
micronutrient supplementation. NIDs have also
facilitated the piloting of campaign approaches for
the delivery of other interventions such as
insecticide treated nets (ITNs) for malaria
prevention. The surveillance capacity developed
for polio has been extensively used to detect and
respond to diseases such as measles, neonatal
tetanus, meningitis, cholera and yellow fever. In
the WHO African Region (AFR), the AFP
network has been used as the framework for
“integrated disease surveillance” (IDS). By 1998,
86% of AFR countries had included measles and
neonatal tetanus and 60% cholera and meningitis.
In the Americas, surveillance for polio and measles
has been closely integrated since 1994. Since
2001, WHO and UNICEF have begun
systematically training polio-funded staff in key
countries to assist with the implementation of the
RED strategy to boost routine coverage.
Because of the increasing reliance of other
international health programmes, particularly the
polio-funded human resources, the Global Polio
Eradication Initiative began in 1999-2000 a series
of discussions on the longterm role that these
resources might play in the work of GAVI and other
communicable disease surveillance and control
initiatives. Recognizing that the potential utility of
the polio-funded human resources network went
beyond immunization, in 2003 the Global Polio
19 By 2010, routine immunization coverage of children under one year of age at 90% nationally, with at least 80% coverage in every district or
equivalent unit.
20 Reduce measles deaths by 50% by end-2005, compared to 1995 levels.
21 TCGs/TAGs: these annual or semi-annual meetings bring together expert advisers, researchers, field staff, national programme managers and
partner agencies to assist strategy development, guide policy and set operational priorities.

















































Eradication Initiative also started discussing the
possibility of sharing activities and costs with other
important health programmes such as the GOARN
and the WHO and UNAIDS ‘3 x 5 Initiative’.
From late 2003 the programme began working
with the WHO Country Focus department to
establish a set of pilot countries for evaluating the
feasibility of expanding the work of this network in
line with country-defined communicable disease
priorities for WHO technical assistance, with a
particular emphasis on the control of vaccine-
preventable diseases. 
Despite the increasing work to share costs
with other programmes, by the end of 2003, many
non-polio activities had become even more highly
dependent on the polio eradication activities,
funding and/or infrastructure. To minimize the
risks inherent in this dependence, these activities,
particularly those which are closely intertwined
with polio campaigns (e.g. GAVI, vitamin A
supplementation), must be “mainstreamed” into
routine programmes within countries, WHO and
UNICEF.
E x p e c t e d  R e s u l t s :
1. Transition polio “campaign” elements to
routine immunization programmes: The
overriding goal of this area of work will be to
ensure full functional integration of the routine
immunization and polio eradication infra-
structures at the country level (e.g. human
resources, equipment, institutional arrangements,
vitamin A delivery). Such integration will help
ensure that the strategic approaches and processes
established for polio eradication bring district
level microplanning, social mobilization and “data
for decision-making” capacity for routine
immunization to the levels achieved for polio
campaigns. The work to develop country-specific
plans for this integration will continue, with
particular attention to the 15 large and/or
conflict-affected countries where almost 85% of
the polio human resources have been deployed.
This work will be closely coordinated with the
GAVI Strategic Framework 2004–2005, as the
priority countries outlined in that framework
closely align with those where the polio
infrastructure is most extensive. As the country-
specific planning advances, tools will be developed
to facilitate the additional training needs for this
broader programme of work. At the global level,
the polio communication tools will be expanded
and updated (i.e. websites, newsletters, media
releases, progress reports) to promote and facilitate
the active engagement of all key stakeholders in
this transition to broader immunization goals.
2. Expand or integrate AFP surveillance with
other diseases of public health importance:
This work will be pursued on a country-by-
country basis through two approaches. AFP
surveillance will be integrated into routine disease
surveillance systems in those countries with
existing structures and capacity, with the first
priority being countries with the strongest
systems and which have been certified as polio-
free. In those countries without such capacity, the
AFP surveillance system will be further expanded
to facilitate the detection, investigation and
response to vaccine-preventable diseases (VPDs)
and other diseases of public health importance
(especially epidemic-prone diseases). By the end of
2004, those countries requiring substantial long-
term support to maintain surveillance capacity
will be identified. Planning will continue for the
institutionalization of this external support into
an integrated surveillance capacity that is
maintained following global certification. All
such countries will, by the end of 2005, have the
training materials and other tools needed to
expand the AFP system to include the reporting
and investigation of additional diseases.
Opportunities will be identified to expand the
skills of polio-funded staff and facilitate their
reintegration, if appropriate, into national
programmes.
3. ‘Mainstream’ Polio-Funded Human
Resources: Between 2004 and 2006, the target
date for stopping polio SIAs in all countries, the
programme will complete the ongoing process of
transitioning to other funding sources those polio
positions which primarily provide technical
assistance for immunization activities and/or social
mobilization. Particular priority will be given to
working with funding streams which support
routine immunization strengthening, accelerated
disease control (e.g. measles mortality reduction)
and/or introduction of new vaccines. Where such
technical assistance is not needed, positions will 
be made redundant and opportunities sought 
with other programmes and organizations. By
2006, the programme will also have refined the

















































surveillance and laboratory diagnosis, that will be
required through global certification and OPV
cessation. In addition, from 2004 the programme
will begin evaluating what proportion of the time
of these polio-funded personnel at national, state
and district levels could be made available for
tasks related to the surveillance and control of
other vaccine-preventable and communicable
diseases. Where it is found feasible, the Global
Polio Eradication Initiative will work with other
programmes to provide additional training,
establish supervisory structures and share costs.
Priority for this work will be given to the 
15 countries which house 85% of the polio-funded
technical assistance, and begin with those which
were polio-free by end-2002. The final phase of
this ‘mainstreaming’ of the polio-funded human
resources will take place from 2008 through 2010,
during which all longterm polio functions will be
fully incorporated into sustainable structures
dealing with multiple diseases or pathogens.
4. Mainstream the major institutional
arrangements for polio eradication: The
priority in this area of work will be to ensure the
continued use of polio-initiated Interagency
Coordinating Committees (ICCs) and, if
appropriate, TAGs, for routine immunization
activities. While the functions of these groups had
been expanded in virtually all countries and
regions by the end of 2003, in many areas the
financial and human resources required to convene
and support these groups were still being provided
exclusively by the Global Polio Eradication
Initiative. By the end of 2006, as SIAs are
concluded in almost all countries, the
continuation of these institutional arrangements
will require that they are also fully supported by
routine immunization personnel and funding
streams, potentially through GAVI itself.
5. Support the scaling-up of other health
interventions: The focus of this work will be on
identifying and supporting those areas where
application of the experience and lessons from
polio eradication could facilitate the MDGs,
especially Target 5, the reduction of under-five
mortality by two-thirds from 1990 levels by 2015.
Particular attention will be given to ensuring
experiences in the areas of human resources,
financing and administration and management are
transferred to the international efforts to
sustainably reduce measles mortality and
morbidity, and to expand the coverage of health
interventions such as vitamin A, ITNs and anti
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Percentage of countries with
integrated or expanded AFP
reporting, as appropriate
(especially for measles and
neonatal tetanus)
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IN addition to 2 specific challenges outlined forstopping poliovirus transmission, there are 6
major challenges that cut across all of the four
objectives outlined in this Strategic Plan. The
following sections outline each of these challenges
and the planned actions of the polio partnership to
mitigate their possible detrimental effects.
5 . 1
P o l i t i c a l  C o m m i t m e n t
a n d  E n g a g e m e n t
First and foremost, continued high-level political
support for, and engagement in, the global polio
eradication effort is essential. In the remaining
endemic countries such engagement is needed at
national and subnational levels to ensure high-
quality implementation of the strategies (see
section 4.1). In polio-free countries endorsement is
needed to improve routine immunization
coverage, sustain high-quality surveillance,
achieve containment of poliovirus stocks, and
ensure the full documentation necessary for
certification. In those countries which also provide
overseas development assistance, continued
support of the political leadership will be critical
to ensure sufficient external financing for a
disappearing disease. 
To facilitate this continued political
engagement, the polio partnership will continue
to develop and implement country-by-country
advocacy plans. Regional and global political
forums will be exploited to maintain the visibility
of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative in this
critical period.
5 . 2
E x t e r n a l  F i n a n c i n g
The second major cross-cutting challenge will 
be to close the 2004–2005 funding gap of 
US$ 150 million to interrupt poliovirus
transmission, and the US$ 380 million to achieve
global certification and mainstream the Global
Polio Eradication Initiative. The central
importance of sufficient funding to the ultimate
success of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative
became acutely evident in early 2003 when, for
the first time since 1999, it was necessary to cancel
or postpone eradication activities due to a lack of
financing. This financing shortfall rapidly
compromised the quality of polio surveillance,
especially in Africa, reduced the speed and quality
of emergency outbreak responses, and hindered
the implementation of activities in key reservoir
areas. Continued financing gaps would
substantially impact all of the major milestones
outlined in this plan.
To address this funding gap, the interagency
Polio Advocacy Group (PAG)23 will continue its
resource mobilization efforts. Special attention
will be given to finalizing the commitment of G8
members (particularly France, Germany and
Italy), to closing the funding gap for eradication
activities in Africa and identifying new partners,
including those interested in mainstreaming the
polio infrastructure as outlined above. Attention
will also be given to assisting Member States of
the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) to
operationalize their 2003 summit resolution to
fund polio activities. The heightened profile 
of polio eradication activities within the UN
agencies, and the identification of polio
eradication as a global public good for health, will
support efforts to expand the polio partnership
and encourage other Organisation for Economic
Co-orperation and Development/ Development
Assistance Committee (OECD/ DAC) countries to
participate in this historic Initiative. The polio
partnership will put a particular emphasis on
securing multiyear financial commitments
through 2008.
C r o s s - C u t t i n g
C h a l l e n g e s
5
23 PAG is an interagency group of external relations, resource mobilization and communications experts from WHO, UNICEF, UN Foundation and

















































24 MOSS compliance refers to the “minimum operating security standards” required of UN agencies working in insecure or potentially
insecure areas.
5 . 3
H i g h - Q u a l i t y  P o l i o
V a c c i n e s
A reliable supply of high-quality polio vaccines
will be needed for all of the major objectives of this
plan. Stopping the final chains of poliovirus
transmission will require an estimated 2.5 billion
doses of WHO-prequalified OPV for SIAs during
the period 2004-2005. Additional OPV will be
required for SIAs in high-risk countries as well as
routine immunization activities; given the
increasing work of the global community to
improve routine immunization through efforts
such as GAVI, the OPV requirements for routine
immunization could increase during this period.
As plans for a vaccine stockpile are developed,
arrangements will need to be made to ensure
continued production capacity for stockpile OPV
through the Global OPV Cessation Phase as well
as the continued availability of specific reagents
and procedures critical for its production and
quality control. In addition to OPV, it is
anticipated that there will be an increasing
demand for IPV, in a variety of formulations,
regardless as to the long-term policy decisions for
future polio immunization. The need to ensure the
implementation of appropriate containment
measures in large-scale IPV production facilities
globally will require close collaborative efforts
between manufacturers, their governmental
oversight authorities, and international biosafety
and biosecurity functions.
To ensure adequate supply of high-quality
polio vaccines, UNICEF and WHO, in
consultation with national governments, will
continue to refine their long-term demand
forecasting work for both OPV and IPV. WHO
will develop the criteria and process for pre-
qualification of IPV containing vaccines. This
work will be shared regularly with OPV and IPV
manufacturers through annual meetings, as well as
ad hoc consultations as requested. The polio
vaccine and immunization research and policy
agendas will continue to inform this area of work. 
5 . 4
C o n f l i c t - A f f e c t e d
C o u n t r i e s  a n d  A r e a s
Although the polio eradication strategies have
been successfully implemented in all conflict-
affected countries, these areas will continue to pose
special challenges for all aspects of the eradication
programme. In addition to the need to stop polio
transmission in Afghanistan, substantial work is
needed to improve and maintain population
immunity in a much larger number of these
countries. Special arrangements will be needed for
some of these countries and areas to verify and
submit the necessary documentation for
certification. Such areas may also have particular
interests which must be represented in
deliberations on future polio immunization policy.
Recognizing the special needs of conflict-
affected areas, the polio partnership will continue
to devote a substantial proportion of its technical
assistance to these areas, particularly through the
deployment of long-term human resources.
Ongoing work with NGO networks will be
sustained and expanded. The close collaboration
that has been established with the UN security
apparatus in many of these areas will also
continue, including the deployment of a limited
number of polio-funded security officers and
further investment in MOSS compliance.24
5 . 5
P u b l i c  I n f o r m a t i o n
a n d  S o c i a l
M o b i l i z a t i o n  
Throughout the Global Polio Eradication
Initiative, the informing and engagement of the
public sector has been central to activities ranging
from strategy implementation in endemic areas to
resource mobilization in donor countries. In donor
countries, a high profile and awareness of the
Global Polio Eradication Initiative is needed to
facilitate resource allocation decisions through
global certification. In all countries, the
development of long-term polio policies,
particularly for routine immunization, will

















































Social mobilization efforts must be enhanced
in the remaining endemic areas to fully engage the
polio-affected populations, as well as to address
rumours which may have undermined public
confidence in the programme. The appropriate
selection and training of vaccinators, the inclusion
of women and underserved groups at all levels, the
need for strong interpersonal communication
skills at the service delivery level, and the
development of appropriate Information,
Education and Communication (IEC) messages
and materials, remain key to the successful
vaccination of every child.
The Global Polio Eradication Initiative will
continue to place a strong emphasis on public
information, social mobilization and
communications during the period 2004-2008.
The technical capacity which has been established
in this area at the global, regional, national and
subnational levels will require additional inputs
and leadership to enhance support to government
efforts. The inter-agency mechanisms for
coordinating communications and social
mobilization inputs (e.g. the Advisory Group on
Communication for Immunisation and Polio
Eradication, the Advisory Group on
Communication for Immunisation (Africa), and
National Social Mobilisation Committees) will
continue. New materials will be developed and
widely disseminated to support this work.
5 . 6
B i o c o n t a i n m e n t
Timely completion of the containment activities
outlined in the Global Action Plan for the Laboratory
Containment of Wild Polioviruses, second edition (GAP
II), is particularly important to the 2004–2008
overall timeline for polio eradication. GAP II
requires that by the end of 2004 all countries will
have completed a nationwide survey of
laboratories, established an inventory of all
facilities holding wild polioviruses or potentially
infectious materials, and implemented 
BSL-2/polio level safety measures. One year after
the last wild poliovirus has been detected (e.g.
from end-2005), all countries must begin either
destroying retained materials, or increasing the
level of biocontainment to BSL-3/polio. While the
progress to date in implementing the GAP II
demonstrates that this timeline is feasible,
achieving these milestones requires accelerating
containment in a number of large industrialized
countries and initiating activities in many recently
endemic countries. The timely introduction,
validation and verification of BSL-3/polio
containment measures at existing IPV production
and quality control facilities using wild
polioviruses, represents a particular challenge to
manufacturers and national oversight authorities.
The expected results for containment, outlined
under objectives 2 and 3 of this Strategic Plan,
highlight the activities that will be undertaken to


















































G o v e r n m e n t s
National governments of polio-endemic, recently-
endemic and polio-free countries are the owners
and beneficiaries of the Global Polio Eradication
Initiative, undertaking the full range of polio
eradication activities outlined in this Strategic
Plan. National resources contributed towards the
implementation of polio eradication activities
include both financial expenditures and in-kind
commitments, such as the time that is contributed
by volunteers, health workers and others in the
implementation of NIDs. Substantial resources are
also expended by governments at national,
state/province, district and local community levels
to pay for petrol, social mobilization, training and
other costs. It has been estimated that polio
endemic countries will have contributed volunteer
time worth at least US$ 2.35 billion for polio
eradication activities between 1988 and 2005.25
Governments of polio-endemic and recently
endemic countries also conduct advocacy with
donor governments and at various multilateral
forums.
6 . 2
S p e a r h e a d i n g
P a r t n e r s
World Health Organization (WHO): Through
its headquarters, regional and country offices,
WHO provides the overall technical direction
and strategic planning for the management and
coordination of the Global Polio Eradication
Initiative. WHO is responsible for ensuring that
all components of the Global Polio Eradication
Initiative Strategic Plan are well implemented,
and has a key role in monitoring and evaluating
all aspects of the Plan. WHO also coordinates
operational/basic scientific research, provides
operational support to ministries of health, and
the training/deployment of human resources.
WHO is the lead technical agency for supporting
AFP surveillance systems, the global polio
laboratory network, resource mobilization, donor
coordination, advocacy and public information.
Rotary International: Through its PolioPlus
program, established in 1985, Rotary
International was, with the Pan American Health
Organization, the first to have the vision of a
polio-free world and continues to play a central
role in global efforts to eradicate polio. Rotary is
the world’s first service organization, with a global
network of 1.2 million members in more than 
160 countries. More than one million Rotary
members have volunteered their time and personal
resources to contribute to the immunization of
nearly two billion children in 122 countries. In
addition, Rotary mobilizes millions of fellow
volunteers to assist during NIDs. Rotary also
provides urgently needed funds. To date, 
the organization has committed more than 
US$ 500 million to polio eradication. Rotary's
Polio Eradication Advocacy Task Force, with the
assistance of the PolioPlus National Advocacy
Advisors, has played a major role in highlighting
polio eradication in international forums and in
influencing decisions by donor governments to
contribute over US$ 1.5 billion to the global
eradication effort. That amount, combined with
direct funds from Rotary, has accounted for more
than half the amount required for the entire global
initiative. In June 2003, Rotary concluded a
second membership fundraising drive, which
exceeded its goal to raise an additional 
US$ 80 million for polio eradication. 
US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC): The most important contribution of the
Atlanta-based CDC continues to be deployment of
its epidemiologists, public health experts, and
scientists to WHO, UNICEF and endemic
countries. In addition, a number of international
and national staff in WHO and UNICEF
headquarters and in the regional and country
offices of both organizations are funded by CDC
grants. CDC also provides funding for the
procurement of OPV required for mass
R o l e s  o f  P a r t n e r
A g e n c i e s
6

















































immunization campaigns, and a wide range of
technical expertise and laboratory support. This
includes staff support for disease surveillance at
global, regional and national levels and outbreak
investigation, especially in areas within or
bordering polio-free zones. CDC works as the
“viral detective” of the four partners, using its
state-of-the-art virological surveillance expertise to
identify the strain of poliovirus involved and
pinpoint its geographical origin. CDC also
provides assistance in the development and
monitoring of the 145 members of the global polio
laboratory network, including funding short-term
and long-term technical support in key countries.
Finally, CDC conducts research which will
facilitate development of long-term immunization
and surveillance policies.
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF):
UNICEF is the lead partner in the procurement 
and distribution of polio vaccines for routine and
supplementary immunizations and with WHO, 
the strengthening of routine immunization
components of the Strategic Plan. With WHO,
UNICEF is the lead partner in the implementation
of intensified NIDs, SNIDs and mop-up campaigns
at country level. UNICEF provides technical
assistance to national coordinators to develop action
plans and secure logistics to access hard-to-reach
places, including in countries affected by conflict.
UNICEF also participates in the global process by
which eradication policies and plans of action are
developed; develops materials for training and
public information; strengthens social mobilization
efforts through its network of communications
officers; and provides cold chain support. UNICEF
is also an active partner in resource mobilization,
advocacy and public information.
6 . 3
D o n o r  a n d  T e c h n i c a l
P a r t n e r s
Agencies for international development
cooperation: These agencies play a central role in
the Global Polio Eradication Initiative through
the provision of multilateral and bilateral support.
They also undertake high-level advocacy with
endemic countries and among their peers, provide
access to technical expertise within their
countries, and give significant technical input
through participation in global, regional and
country-level ICCs and technical oversight bodies.
International development agencies have
contributed to the Global Polio Eradication
Initiative’s resource mobilization strategy and
have assisted the development of long-term plans
by making commitments through to global
certification. Some of the long-standing partners
include Canada (CIDA), Germany (kfW), Japan
(JICA), the United Kingdom (DFID) and the
United States of America (CDC and USAID).
These donors have contributed or committed 
US$ 1.76 billion to the Global Polio Eradication
Initiative, or 59% of all the funds received or
projected, between 1985 and 2005. Partners such
as Australia, Denmark, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands and Norway have made significant
contributions and are some of the leading
supporters, especially on a per capita basis. The
Global Polio Eradication Initiative is also
welcoming new donor partners such as Ireland,
New Zealand and the Russian Federation. In
addition to focusing on development agencies in
OECD countries, the Global Polio Eradication
Initiative is looking to expand its relationship
with key Arab and Asian nations.
Foundations (see also ‘Rotary International’
under Spearheading Partners): Foundations
provide financial support, advocacy and assistance
in partnership development. The United Nations
Foundation (UNF) has provided substantial
assistance through direct financial support,
strengthening of the Global Polio Eradication
Initiative’s fundraising capacity, leveraging funds
through matching grants and introducing other
partners to the Global Polio Eradication Initiative.
The UNF also works closely with the
spearheading partners in global polio advocacy
activities and resource mobilization efforts. After
the Rotary Foundation, the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation has been the largest donor
foundation to the Global Polio Eradication
Initiative having committed US$ 75 million. The
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has also played
an important advocacy and promotion role for
polio eradication. The Rotary Foundation, the Bill
and Melinda Gates Foundation and UNF have also
supported the Global Polio Eradication Initiative
by collaborating with the World Bank to
implement a loan buy-down mechanism which

















































Development Banks and Multilateral
Agencies: Institutions like the World Bank and
the Inter-American Development Bank have
provided access to country-level financing through
the provision of “soft loans”. The World Bank has
also collaborated with the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation, Rotary International and UNF to
implement a funding mechanism to assist the
procurement of polio vaccines for Nigeria and
Pakistan. The European Commission (EC) has
supported the Global Polio Eradication Initiative
in countries such as India and Nigeria.
Intergovernmental bodies such as the G8, the
African Union and the Organization of the Islamic
Conference (OIC) have strongly supported the
Global Polio Eradication Initiative by providing a
high profile for polio eradication in their summits
and pledging both financial and political support. 
Corporations: Corporations and members of the
private sector have provided monetary and in-kind
contributions to the Global Polio Eradication
Initiative. Most often their contributions are for a
specific area or purpose which requires targeted
funding. Aventis Pasteur is the Global Polio
Eradication Initiative’s longest standing corporate
partner having donated 120 million doses of OPV
over a 10-year period. This vaccine has been
earmarked for campaigns in specific African
countries which are emerging from conflict. Other
key corporate supporters include Wyeth, which
funds the African Regional Polio Laboratory
Network; the International Federation of
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations
(IFPMA), which coordinated a 100 million dose
vaccine donation from Aventis Pasteur,
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and Chiron; DeBeers,
which provided funding for polio campaigns in
Angola; and British Airways, which funded an
important mop-up campaign in western Zambia.
Private sector fundraising campaigns organized by
Rotary International and UNF, and by the various
UNICEF national committees, have also
generated significant support for the Global Polio
Eradication Initiative.
6 . 4
I n t e r n a t i o n a l
H u m a n i t a r i a n
O r g a n i z a t i o n s  a n d
N G O s
International humanitarian organizations:
Organizations such as the International Federation
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)
assist the Global Polio Eradication Initiative by
conducting advocacy at international and national
levels, and contributing financial, operational and
technical support in selected priority countries.
The Red Cross/Red Crescent societies contribute
to the implementation of mass immunization and
surveillance activities in the field, with emphasis
on deploying networks of community-based
volunteers for social mobilization. The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
assists in facilitating access in areas of conflict and
refugee populations.
Nongovernmental organizations: NGOs play a
key role in the implementation of country-level
activities. The NGO umbrella-organization
CORE through the efforts of its many members
such as ADRA, CRS, CARE, Plan International,
Save the Children, and World Vision, assists the
polio eradication effort by building partnerships
between the government and the communities
they serve, supporting supplemental
immunization campaigns, assisting with AFP
surveillance, and monitoring the immunization
status of children. NGOs help train volunteers and
health workers, transport vaccines and equipment,
monitor the quality of the cold chain, and assist
with communication and social mobilization
activities. NGOs also play an important advocacy
role, particularly at the national and subnational
levels. Some NGOs, such as the Albert B. Sabin
Vaccine Institute which formally joined the
Global Polio Eradication Initiative in 2003, play
both an international advocacy and technical
advisory role. NGOs such as Médecin Sans
Frontières and Save the Children have been
important in reaching children in conflict-affected
countries such as Angola, the Democratic Republic


















































V a c c i n e
M a n u f a c t u r e r s
The vaccine industry plays a critical role in
supporting routine and supplementary polio
eradication activities by making available
sufficient quantities of assured quality polio
vaccine. The manufacturers make sure that
sufficient quantities of vaccine are available in a
timely manner by ensuring that the production
and investment plans for capacity increases are
initiated at the right times. To guarantee timely
availability and a minimum of vaccine wastage,
the vaccine industry also works in close
collaboration with UNICEF and WHO which
includes sharing short- and long-term demand
schedules and production plans. In addition, the
vaccine industry provides technical inputs and
initiates research in response to product
requirements after certification as suggested and
defined by the new Strategic Plan. Furthermore,
the industry has provided contributions in-kind

















































The experience of the smallpox eradicationinitiative, combined with the risks associated
with continued use of OPV, demonstrate the need
to plan for a combination of longterm and time-
limited polio eradication activities following
certification of global polio eradication (target date
2008). The ongoing development of the products
and policies needed for this phase of the Global
Polio Eradication Initiative precludes a detailed
assessment of the financial resources required at
that time; however, it is possible to anticipate the
major activities that will be required.
The longterm activities are those needed to
minimize and manage the risks of re-introduction
and re-establishment of wild polioviruses. For
example, prior to the cessation of OPV, and
indefinitely thereafter, all polioviruses will need to
be subject to longterm containment26.
Independent verification of appropriate storage
and handling of wild and vaccine-derived
poliovirus strains will be needed, particularly for
manufacturing sites that amplify wild polioviruses
to produce IPV. Stockpiles of monovalent OPV,
and possibly other formulations, will need to be in
place and maintained in the longterm.
Internationally-agreed mechanisms will be
required to govern the use of these stockpiles, with
special attention to ensuring priority for those
countries that decide to forego the use of IPV for
routine immunization. Because of their longterm
nature, these activities will be incorporated into
existing national, WHO and UNICEF structures
and mechanisms for managing the identification,
response and containment of high priority
pathogens.
In addition to these longterm activities, a
number of time-limited actions will be needed to
manage the short-term risk of circulating vaccine-
derived polioviruses (cVDPVs) that will be
associated with the cessation of OPV. Foremost
among these activities will be the heightening and 
sustaining of AFP surveillance for at least two
years after the cessation of OPV. Particular
capacity will be needed in those areas at highest
risk for the emergence of a cVPDV (i.e. those with
very low routine immunization coverage) and in
those countries which decide not to introduce IPV.
Should the ongoing evaluation of supplementary
surveillance strategies (e.g. environmental
sampling) demonstrate the capacity to
significantly enhance the detection of circulating
polioviruses, these methods will have had to be
introduced at least 1 year in advance of OPV
cessation. Finally, if there is evidence that boosting
population immunity substantially reduces the
risk of cVDPV emergence, in some areas the
cessation of OPV may need to be preceded by
pulse immunization with OPV.
The use of IPV in routine immunization
programmes represents a special issue. Some
countries have indicated their desire to forego its
use completely, some are considering a time-
limited approach in which it would be used as part
of a 3-5 year transition strategy during the
cessation of OPV, and others have stated their
intention to continue longterm IPV use for routine
immunization. Although some countries may
forego the use of IPV, those which do decide to use
it for a time-limited period or in the longterm,
will need to have introduced that vaccine by 2008
and made provision for its procurement for the
necessary period. Given the inter-relatedness of
decisions on IPV introduction, the use of
combination vaccines and longterm national
policy for other antigens (e.g. pertussis component
of DTP), key stakeholders in the provision of such
vaccines for routine immunization, such as GAVI,
will need to be centrally involved in this process.
The resource implications of the Global OPV
Cessation Phase will be developed as part of the
work to establish appropriate products and policies
for this period, outlined in Objective 3 of the 
26 To be developed for the 3rd Edition of the Global Action Plan for Laboratory Containment of Wild Polioviruses. 
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Global Polio Eradication Initiative Strategic Plan
2004-2008. The financing requirements will be
driven by internationally-agreed decisions during
2005-2007 on the actual process for stopping
OPV, the size and composition of vaccine
stockpiles, and the future role of other polio
vaccines. Given the longterm nature of many of
the activities of the Global OPV Cessation Phase,
the required resources will need to be raised and
channelled through the sustainable structures and
mechanisms into which these activities will have
been incorporated. ❐

The spearheading partners of the 
Global Polio Eradication Initiative are:
World Health Organization
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